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Abstract 
The study investigated intensity of informal competition among firms in Ethiopia and predicted the level and 
nature of this competition. The study found that prevalence of highest corruption, tax rates, financial constrained 
are found to be positively and significantly affecting competition against informal firms in Ethiopia.  On the 
contrary, firm size found to be negatively and significantly affecting competition against informal firms. 
Similarly, the study revealed that tax regulation and inspection enforcement conducted by tax officials could not 
save firms from informality. Even if most research indicated that increase in government enforcement on tax 
code lead to reduce informality, however in this research it is required further study as to how tax code 
inspections and regulation could not bring negative result on informal competition  
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1. Introduction 
Competition is an engine of economic growth in most markets since it induces higher rates of productivity 
growth; however, competition between formal and informal firms is not necessarily lead to productive. Informal 
competition is harmful to overall economic performance since the cost advantage informal firms enjoy is a result 
of ignoring many or all business regulations. There are also cost disadvantages to informality. Some of these 
disadvantages stem from inaccessibility to formal credit markets and to the courts. This makes informal firms 
less efficient. (Djankov et al, 2003). Formal firms operating in a context where informal firms are widespread are 
likely to be negatively affected by the operations of informal firms. While sometimes the informal sector itself 
has been a source of innovations (Radjou et al., 2012). On the other hand, informal producers may affect formal 
firms’ innovation decisions are via competition in the product market. By their very nature, informal firms face 
lower entry costs than formal firms, since they are less affected by regulatory burdens imposed on formal firms 
(McKenzie,Seynabou Sakho, 2010) 
Being compensate for the lack of legal protection that courts provide, informal firms make deals that are 
small to minimize possible losses and they make these deals with parties where there are long-established 
relations. Small contracts, however, usually involve high fixed costs. Also, limiting transactions to parties with 
whom informal firms have long-established relations means that informal firms exploit only a small and narrow 
set of market opportunities. Inefficiencies and limited markets is the price of reducing uncertainty and insuring 
against losses in the informal sector. 
Even though most of studies showed theoretically and empirically the negative impacts of the informal 
sector on the overall economy, its size is however, continues to grow very fast in developing countries (El-
Hamidi 2011).The business environment substances in determining the nature and size of the cost advantages of 
informality. The higher the regulatory burdens of being formal, the higher are an savings from informality. This 
cost-benefit calculation affects the size of the informal sector as higher savings from being informal draws more 
firms to informality, resulting in a bigger informal sector (Djankov et al 2002). While the size of the informal 
sector is a vital factor in determining the competitive effects on formal firms more in a market generally means 
more price competition regulation is most importantly a major determinant of the intensity of competition from 
the informal sector.  
The government’s capacity to enforce regulations also matters in the evaluation of the cost of regulatory 
obligations firms face. An informal firm’s chances of getting caught for not complying with laws and regulations 
are a direct function of the government’s capacity to enforce these. The two points above on the determinants of 
the size and intensity of informal competition are the central focus of this paper.  
 
1.1. Statement of the Problem  
Several definitions of informal firms have been obtainable by different studies; these studies rely on Nichter and 
Gold mark (200) who defines informal firms as “businesses that are unregistered but derive income from the 
production of legal goods and services.” One distinguished clarification revealed is the recent study of Iriyama et 
al. (2016). The study exhibited that informal firms are able to operate more quickly by avoiding regulations and 
more cheaply by avoiding taxes and fees. When facing these informal competitors, formal firms respond by 
engaging in corruption payoffs to regulatory officials in order to follow informal firms to try to achieve equality 
on speed and low cost. 
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In assessing the determinants of informal activity, informal firms are most common in countries where the 
legal, economic, and regulatory systems are such that it is costly and procedurally challenging to register firms 
and operate in the realm of law (Godfrey, 2011). For instance, higher tax rates, corruption, extortion, and high 
cost-benefit of achiving output have been shown to positively influence the extent of hidden business activity 
and informal activity (Johnson et al., 2000; Schneider and Enste, 2002; de Soto, 2000). 
Informal competition from informal firm’s remains relatively less studied and underexplored in developing 
countries. Iriyama, Kishore and Talukdar(2016) on their recent study endeavored to address this gap by founding 
potential competitive advantages of informal firms, including the ability to operate more quickly and at lower 
costs by avoiding regulations. The study also argued that one way formal firms can respond is to engage in 
corrupt activities such as payoffs to regulatory officials in an attempt to achieve parity on speed and low cost. 
Generally, the extant of literatures in different country levels have informed the determinants and intensity of 
informal completion in an economy; however, the intensity of informal completion among firms in Ethiopia has 
remained relatively less surveyed. Yet, this paper tries to fill this gap by analyzing. Primary data source of 2015 
World Bank Enterprise Surveys for Ethiopia.  
 
1.2 Objectives of the Study 
The objective of this study is to investigate intensity of completion against informal firms and identify the 
associated factors. 
Hypothesis 1: Size of firms are not significantly and negatively related to competition against informal firms 
Hypothesis 2: Experience of top manager is not significantly and negatively related to competition against 
informal firms (informal competition). 
 
2. Literature Review 
Gonzalez and Lamina (2007) examined the characteristics of formal firms subject to the practices of competitors 
in the informal sector in 14 Latin American countries in 2006. Using a probit regression model, the study 
assumed that formal and informal firms compete with each other and are not in segmented or separated markets 
as suggested by the dual economic theory.  The study revealed  that  formal  firms  most  resembling  informal  
ones  are  the  ones  most adversely affected by informal competition. These formal firms are usually small, 
credit constrained firms, operating in industries with low entry costs and serving the same kind of consumers as 
informal firms. They also concluded that informal competition is a threat, especially in countries with low 
government capacity and highly regulated. 
Friesen and Wacker (2013) investigated the relationship between formal firms’ access to finance and 
informal competition in 114 developing and transition countries over the period 2006 to 2011.Using their  
analysis  on  the  results of Gonzalez and Lamanna (2007)  by assuming that the existence of informal  
competition  threatens  the  operations  of formal  firms. Using a nonlinear ordered response model, the study 
found that the more financially constrained formal firms are, the more they are subject to competition from the 
informal sector. They concluded that the financial constraint is the first determinant of informal competition’s 
severity. This in turn is also affected by other variables, such as corruption, labor regulation and firm size. 
Taking into consideration the fact that informality is the main force of productivity gap between developed 
and developing countries, Hendy and Zaki (2013) found that the probability of belonging to the informal sector 
is a function of firm age, entrepreneur gender, age and education.  Using dataset on micro and small enterprise in 
Egypt and Turkey, the study also concluded that the productivity differential between formal and informal firms 
in Egypt is not significant comparing to the Turkish case. 
Ali (2014) focused the multiplier effect associated with informality: once a firm joins the informal sector, 
the social stigma associated to operate informally and to break rules decreases. Then, more firms and persons are 
encouraged to join this informal sector. The considerate of this vicious cycle is subject to the quality of the 
regulatory environment and institution. The complexity in the entrance of new firm in terms of tax rates, 
regulatory burdens and access to finance encourages firms to join the informal sector. As highlighted by De Soto 
(1990), informal enterprises are a consequence of government bureaucracy. As a result, participants in the 
informal sector in Egypt might choose to remain informal not only to avoid taxes and regulation but also due to 
the inability of the government to enforce law and regulation (Charmes, 2000). 
Gonzalez and Lamanna (2007) conducted a study entitled who fears competition from informal firms? 
Evidence from Latin America with the 2006 World Bank Enterprise Surveys for Latin America using probit 
model .The study used  firm size ,capacity utilization , number of buyers ,export ,financial dependence ,tax 
rate ,government capacity , corruption ,access to formal finance are found to be the determinants of informal 
competition  
McCann and Bahl (2017) investigated   the influence of competition from informal firms on new product 
development. Using logistic regression and development of new product as dependent binary variable .The study 
used irregular payment prevalence, regulatory hopefulness, firm age and firm size as an expiatory variable.  
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Iriyama et al.(2016) studied the threat from informal competitors was largely associated with cost or speed 
advantages from avoiding entanglements with regulatory institutions. Whether this threat merits response by the 
focal firms depends on how much of an advantage the focal firms perceives has been gained by informal 
competitors. When focal firms’ managers are negative about the strength of the regulatory environment, they are 
likely to perceive the advantage gained by the avoidance activities of informal firms to be more significant. In 
contrast, optimism about the regulatory environment is associated with perceptions of less consequential 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1. The Data Set 
The Enterprise Surveys collect data from key manufacturing and service sectors in every region of the world. For 
these analytical purposes, the study used primary data source from the 2015 World Bank Enterprise Surveys for 
Ethiopia (Ethiopia - Enterprise Survey 2015). The standardized Enterprise Survey questionnaire includes both 
objective and subjective questions referring to the business environment. Subjective variables are based on the 
perceptions of the surveyed firms regarding key factors that constrain their operations. The questionnaire, 
include among; others; in the  areas of corruption ,crime ,informality , regulatory and 
tax ,gender ,finance ,infrastructure ,innovation and technology, work place, firm characteristics and the biggest 
obstacle. 
Ethiopia Enterprise Survey 2015 by that time was used three stage stratified random sampling. Three levels 
of stratification were industry establishment, size, and region. Industry stratification was designed in the way that 
follows: the population was stratified into four manufacturing industries, and three services sectors. Size 
stratification was defined as follows: small (5 to 19 employees), medium (20 to 99 employees), and large (more 
than 99employees). Whereas, regional stratification for the 2015 Ethiopia ES was done across six geographic 
regions: Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa city administrations, and Amhara, Oromia, SNNPR and Tigray regional 
states. The total number of sampled establishments contacted for the survey was 33 %( 1056) and  as well the ES 
covers about 848 emprises nationwide. Finally the data set was cleaned by avoiding irregularities like I don’t 
know answerers before putting into analysis.  
 
3.2. Methods of Data Analysis: 
In the study of intensity of informal or unregister competition among firms through descriptive and econometric 
methods of data analysis were used to assess the relationship between explanatory and dependent variables. 
3.2.1. Descriptive Statistics: 
Descriptive statistics were utilized to assess the characteristics of the sample Reponses that determined intensity 
of informal competition among firms in Ethiopia. This information was considered to augment the econometric 
analysis results. The  descriptive analysis  include among others , tools such  as  minimum,  maximum,  mean, 
percentage, standard deviation, frequency distribution 
3.2.2. Econometric Model 
The study employed binary probit regression model to study the intensity of informal competition among firms 
in Ethiopia. 
Yi = ßX’+U Where, Yi is dependent dummy variable reflecting the probability of competition of firms against 
informal firms. It takes the value of one for establishment compete against unregister firms and the value of zero 
otherwise. X ‘is a vector of explanatory variables that determines the intensity of informal competition, ß is a 
vector of unknown parameters to be estimated from the probit model. 
Definitions of Explanatory Variables 
Access finance – Limited access to financial services is one of the main constraints for informal firms 
(Morrisson 1995). The study used a measure of the utilization of commercial lines of credit or a loan from a 
financial institution as a way to evaluate the level of access to finance that firms have.. Here is created a binary 
variable where a value of one (1) indicates a firm access to credit and zero otherwise. 
Exporter– For reasons of competitiveness, scale, technology, access to markets, access to credit, uncertain legal 
status, fixed costs of exporting, etc., informal firms are neither able nor willing to compete in export markets 
(González and Lamanna.2007). For this reason, the study included a dummy variable, where the value of one (1) 
represents direct exporter and zero (0) otherwise 
Tax rate– the ES refers to the tax that a company must pay or withhold in a given year. It measures the 
administrative burden in paying taxes. Taxes are measured at all levels of government obstacle to the current 
operations of the establishment. Variable is normalized to a zero to one where one (1) indicates the highest tax 
rate of obstacles (severe obstacles and major obstacles) and zero otherwise.(Source: Doing business 2006, 
Creating  Available: www.doing:www.doing business .org) 
Size of firm-used in log of number of Permanent full-time employees in the firm Age of firms is calculated by 
subtracting 2014 from year of establishment began operations 
Sex of the top manager- it is a control variable and assign 1for female and zero for male  
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Regulated by tax officials-refers whether establishment in last year, was visited or inspected by tax officials      
or required to meet with them. Assign 1 for yes response and zero for no   
Corruption- refers the degree at which corruption is being an obstacle to the current operation of the 
establishment. Variable is normalized to a zero to one where one (1) indicates highest corruption and (0) 
otherwise..  
Obstacles to accessing finance - refers the extent at which access to finance is being an obstacle to the current 
operations of the establishment. Variable is normalized to zero to one where one (1) indicates the highest 
obstacles for accessing finance and zero otherwise.  
New product refers to whether the establishment introduced new or significantly improved products or services 
in the last three years. New product development is more likely when firms perceive greater obstacles from 
informal competition McCann and Bahl (2017).Yes for 1 and zero for No. 
 
3.3 Model Specification 
In this research, the relation between unemployment rate and the explanatory variable time was used simple time 
series regression model. Before employing this technique, the researcher had checked the relation between 
dependent and independent variables were graphically linear. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1. Descriptive analysis 
Descriptive statistics such as mean, minimum and maximum values range and standard deviations were used to 
describe the socio –economic characteristics of the sample Reponses that determined intensity of informal 
competition among firms in Ethiopia 
Table1. Summary of factors characteristics    
Variables N Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Size of firms 512 94.40385 374.9571 1 7600 
Sex of the top manager  
 Female (9%) 
 Male ((91%) 
512 .0885478 .2842578 0 1 
Age of firms in years 510 13.50885 12.85561 0 89 
Experience of top manager in years 512 15.79682 10.71342 1 60 
Percentage of firms direct export their sales (%) 
 Direct export (9.7%) 
 Indirect export (90.3%) 
512 5.809113 20.76637 1 100 
 Percentage firms inspected by tax officials last year 
 Yes (57.6%) 
 No (42.4%) 
512 1.423645 .4944401 1 2 
No .of times the firm inspected by tax officials 466 5.178112 17.29779 1 300 
Source: ES survey, 2014 
Out of the total sampled firms, female top manager accounts for 9% while the rest 91% are males. The 
sampled establishment on average obtains their sale directly from export is about 9.7%.The study indicated that 
the average size of firm is 94 employees with standard deviation of 374.957.The maximum is 7600 employees 
while the minimum is 1.The average age of the sampled establishment is about 13.5 years with maximum of 89 
years and minimum of 0 years with standard deviation 12.40. The average experience of top manager is 16 years 
with standard deviation of 10.7134. Likewise, percentage of firms those are inspected and visited by tax officials 
last year was about 57.6%, on average they are inspected 5 times a year. 
 
4.2. Econometrics Analysis 
In order to compute intensity of informal competition, binary probit model was employed.  The model had a Log 
pseudo likelihood of (-313.81816) after third iteration and the Wald chi2 test statistics with 10 degree of freedom 
=51.97. Prob> chi2 = 0.0000 revealed that the independent variables included in the model are adequately 
estimated (i.e., the model is adequate). In addition to this, goodness-of-fit test was carried out to examine 
whether  determining factors of informal competition  estimated probability is fit to this type of regression or not, 
The result shows that the pearson chi2(496) = 510.22 and Prob> chi 2 = 0.3284. As indicated by the goodness-of-
fit (gof) tests after probit , the null that the model  is  fittest  is not rejected  at  all levels of significant  in  the 
model,  suggesting  that  the  model is fit for probit model. 
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Table2. Factors affecting informal competition  
Variables Coefficients Robust SE P>|t Marginal effects 
Degree of obstacle to access finance .3507068*** .127184 0.006 . .1358043  
Exporter -.3194113 .2061 0.121 -.1163837 
Tax rate 2765964* .147023 0.060 .1076491 
Size of firms -.1784512*** .046435 0.000 -.0681911 
Sex of the top manager .136318 .2187715 0.539 .0511053 
Tax rule enforcement .2609864** .120426 0.030 .0987957 
Access to finance .0149718 .1264851 0.998 .0057198 
Degree of corruption  .2717678** .1373332 0.048 .1055688 
Age of firms .019107 .0747143 0.798 .0073013  
Experience of top manager  0160833*** .005939  0.007 .0061459 
Cons. -.4777195 .3170238 0.637 - 
Note: Number of observations 510; Waldchi2 (10) 51.97; Prob>chi2 0.0000; Log pseudo likelihood -313.81816 
*** Significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% 
By using the estimated parameters of the linear probability model, and asking whether the establishment 
compete against unregistered firms or not, the study found that the probability of firms those are competing 
against unregistered or informal firms are about 38.5%. 
The result of the probit model analysis indicated that firm size is significantly and negatively related with 
firms those are competing against informal firms at 1% level of significant. The study revealed that firm size 
negatively influence completion against informal firms as compared to formal firms. A World Bank study on 
informality in Latin America points out that “formality rises rapidly with firm size and productivity” (pg. 135; 
Perry et al, 2007).As before, the study argued that firms that are less productive, therefore tending to be more 
like informal firms, face informal competition more directly than more productive formal firms .The marginal 
effect result showed that a unit  increase in permanent workers   in an establishment results  in a 0.00068 %  
decrease in the intensity of informal competition   as compared to the formal one (i.e., saving from informality) 
while keeping  other variables constant . 
Tax rate found positively and significantly influence intensity of informal competition among firms. The 
result of the probit model indicates that intensity of competition against informal firms is increasing as the 
prevalence of tax rate impediment to the business environment increases. The plausible reason could be a higher 
tax rate forces the formal firms to be informal and informal firms remains as informal. In Doing Business 
indicators tax rate refers to the tax that a company must pay or withhold in a given year. It also measures the 
administrative burden in paying taxes (González and Lamanna, 2007)).Moreover, from  marginal effects, being 
highest tax rate prevalence, citrus paribus, increase intensity of informal competition by 10.8 %  as compared to  
firms  that perceived it not highest obstacles and or no obstacles. .  
Corruption found positively and significantly influences intensity of informal competition at 10% level of 
significant. The result of the probit model indicated that intensity of competition against informal firms is 
increasing as obstacles of corruption to the business increases.The plausible reason could be a highest corruption 
drive formal firms to be informal and informal firm’s remains as informal. According to Iriyama, Kishore and 
Talukdar (2016) , in their study argued  that one way formal firms can respond to informal competition by  
engaging  in corrupt activities such as payoffs to regulatory officials in an attempt to achieve parity on speed and 
low cost .From marginal effects, highest corruption prevalence , citrus paribus, increase intensity of informal 
competition by 10.6 %   as compared to firms  those  perceived it not highest obstacles.. .    
The study also found that access to Finance is an obstacle to the current operations of an establishment, 
significantly influence intensity of informal competition. The result of the probit model showed that intensity of 
competition against informal firms increases as an obstacle of accessing finance increases. According to 
Morrisson (1995) ,found that limited access to financial services is one of the main constraints for informal firms 
to remain informal. The plausible reason could be a higher obstacle for accessing finance  drives the formal firms 
to be informal and informal firms leftovers as informal .Moreover, from marginal effects,  highest  obstacle of 
accessing  finance ,all other variables keep constant, increase intensity of informal competition by 13.6 % as 
compared to firms those are perceiving it  not highest obstacles . 
Likewise, by using the estimated parameters of the linear probability model, and taking tax official’s 
regulation and inspection of an establishment over the last year as an example of enforcing tax regulation, 
intensity of informal competition is 9.9% higher for firms who are regulated and inspected by tax officials over 
the last year as compared to firms those are not visited. In practical terms, firms those are visited and inspected 
by tax officials regularly, they get and learn to do their business formally in accordance with the rules and 
regulation of the tax code, and firms are saving from informality. However, in this case, in a country like 
Ethiopia, informality does not seem to decrease because there is no a well rigorous system to implement regular 
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inspection. The higher the regulatory burdens of being formal, the higher are savings from informality. However, 
the cost-benefit calculation affects the size of the informal sector as higher savings from being informal draws 
more firms to informality, resulting in a bigger informal sector (Djankov et al 2002, Schneider 2000). Informal 
firms are most common in countries where the legal and regulatory systems are such that it is costly and 
procedurally challenging to register firms and operate in the realm of law (Godfrey, 2011).  
Experience of the top manager also found to be positively and significantly influence intensity of informal 
competition. The result of the probit model indicates that intensity of informal competition is increasing as the 
experience of top manager increases. The marginal effect result exhibited that a one-year increase in experience 
of top managers led to an increase intensity of informal competition by 0.6% as compared to formal ones.. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The study hypothesized that firm size is negatively and significantly related with prevalence of completion 
against informal firms. The study found that firm size is negatively related with the occurrence of informal 
competition. Increasing firm size obliged firms to utilize their maximum production capacity and that could 
serve them to decrease price, and this in turn provide an incentive to overcome intensity of informal competition.  
Whereas ,the study also hypothesized that experience of top manager is negatively and significantly affecting   
intensity of informal competition .However, the result revealed that experience of top manager is adversely 
affecting informal competition .That is to say ,experience of top managers do not save the firm from informal 
competition ... 
Likewise, inspection and meeting with tax official ,for instance 6 times in  a year  could not seem to 
contribute for reducing the intensity of informal competition .The plausible reason could be, in developing 
country like Ethiopia , there is no a full-fledged  system that could help to monitor informality as a whole .The 
study also found that male  headed firms are 10 times greater as compared to female headed firms .This implies 
that women’s are not  yet empowered  in the sectors under study and it requires due  attention by the 
government . 
Similarly, average age of firms and experience of top manager are so adequate to obtain their sale directly 
from export .However, the prevalence average of firms those are engaging in this activities  are  about 9.7 % . 
This could be explained by different reasons in literatures; however, it requires deep study for further researchers. 
Finally, the study found that Prevalence of highest tax rate, corruption, and obstacle of accessing finance are 
found to be the major concerns that are aggravating the intensity of informal competition in Ethiopia.  
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